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Chapter 10
A Decade of Government-Mandated
Privately Run Pensions in Mexico: What
Have We Learned?
Tapen Sinha and Maria de los Angeles Yañez
In 1942 social security became compulsory in Mexico. Administered by
the Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social (IMSS) and known as Seguro de
Invalidez, Vejez, Cesancía en Edad Avanzada y Muerte (IVCM, or Disability,
Old Age, and Death Security), the program covered the following risks for
all workers in the formal sector: accidents at work and sickness caused by
work; maternity and sickness unrelated to work; life insurance and incapac-
ity; and old-age pension (at the age of 60).
On July 1, 1997, a new privatized pension plan—called the Seguro de
Retiro, Cesantía en Edad Avanzada y Vejez (RCV, or Retirement and Old
Age Insurance)—took effect, replacing the old system for new entrants to
the labor market. Also introduced was a separate component, the Seguros
de Invalidez y Vida (IV, or Life and Disability Insurance). Under the new
system, the old IVCM PAYGO system was abandoned. Workers entering the
labor force after July 1, 1997 had to join the new plan (about one million
workers enter the labor force every year). Workers who were already in the
labor market can choose between the old and new plans at retirement.
The reforms were instituted with the purported purpose of rescuing the
old system from fiscal unsustainability (IMSS 1995). The IMSS claimed that
We thank the Instituto Tecnológico Autónomo de México (ITAM) and the Asociación Mex-
icana de Cultura (AC) for their generous support of our research. Much of the information
reported in this chapter come from the Comisión Nacional del Sistema de Ahorro para
el Retiro (CONSAR), the government pension regulatory agency. We are grateful to them
for sharing this information. Discussions with various colleagues were useful. In particular,
conversations with Olivia Mitchell, Andras Uthoff, Estelle James, and Roberto Bonilla were
illuminating, as were discussions with participants of various forums where some of these
results were presented. In particular, participants of the conference organized by the Mex-
ican Congress, the conference organized by the National Actuarial Association in Mexico
(CONAC), and the conference of the Society of Actuaries made valuable comments. We thank
Nancy Condon and Stephen J. Kay for meticulously editing this document and for making a
series of very useful comments. However, we alone are responsible for the opinions expressed
herein. These do not necessarily represent the views of the institutions with which we are
affiliated.
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by 2003 the system would produce deficits. Unfortunately, the assumptions
behind the model used for these projections were never fully disclosed.
This muddled and hurried reform has given birth to a new system in which
many affiliates may end up with very little in their accounts, and the gov-
ernment may have to bail them out by paying the minimum pension. This
chapter shows that the transition costs could be high, and that management
fees have taken a big bite out of retirees’ savings (about 20% of their
benefits).
This chapter first provides a short description of the new system with
special attention to the cuota social, or social quota, and the housing sub-
account. It then discusses the coverage issue in the context of the gov-
ernment’s claim that higher coverage would be an important advantage
of the new system. It then looks at the market structure of the pension
funds in Mexico and investment portfolios, and tackles the cost structure
of running the funds, transition costs, and cost of the payout phase, noting
the inequality between men and women in terms of the pension payout
in the future. Finally, it reviews the conditions that will lead low-income
affiliates to fall back on the minimum pension guaranteed by the reform.
Contribution Rates Under the Old and New Systems
Under the old system, total contributions were 8.5 percent of base salary,
with a tripartite split among employers (5.95%), employees (2.125%), and
the government (0.425%). There was an additional payment of 2 percent
of base salary into the Sistema Para el Retiro (SAR, or the retirement
account). The maximum included in the base salary was equal to ten times
the minimum wage.
The IV has a premium of 2.5 percent of wage, of which the employer
pays 1.75 percent, the worker pays 0.625 percent, and the government pays
0.125 percent. Since the 1997 reform, the government has contributed an
additional amount independent of the wage of the person. Called the cuota
social, this additional amount is set at 5.5 percent of the minimum salary in
the Federal District of Mexico. For workers earning one minimum wage or
less, the social quota is enormously important: it is equivalent to 90 percent
of the minimum wage. Even for affiliates earning 3 times the minimum
wage, the social quota still accounts for almost 30 percent of their total
contribution to retirement savings under a publicly mandated but privately
managed fund called an Administradora de Fondos de Retiro (AFORE).
For affiliates earning 10 times the minimum wage, the social quota equals
almost 9 percent of the contribution—a figure that actually understates the
importance of the social quota because by law, no fee can be charged on its
flow. However, it does not prevent funds from charging fees on the balance.
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Subaccounts
Each affiliate must contribute to two principal subaccounts: the Sistema
de Ahorro para el Retiro (SAR, or the Retirement Savings System) and
the Instituto de Fondo Nacional de la Vivienda para los Trabajadores
(INFONAVIT, or the government-run housing credit agency). Affiliates
can also make voluntary contributions to SAR on top of their required
contribution. During the period 2001–5, SAR received about 65 percent
of total contributions, and the rest went to the housing subaccount. Policy-
makers had hoped that workers would make substantial contributions to
the voluntary account, given the tax break, but total contributions so far
have been relatively small, less than half a percent of total contribution.
Coverage
Historically, most PAYGO pensions systems in industrialized countries have
covered the vast majority of workers—but not in Mexico. When social
security became compulsory in Mexico in 1942, it had very low rates of
coverage of the labor force: in 1946, less than 3 percent. By 1952 coverage
was still less than 5 percent, and in 1970 it was a little more than 25 percent.
By the mid-1990s, the IVCM still covered only about 30 percent of workers
(an additional 8% of the labor force was covered by special regimes for
government employees). These figures stand in sharp contrast to coverage
in more developed countries. In the USA, for example, social security
coverage from 1935 to 1940 went from 0 to 63.7 percent, and by 1951, it
was 93.7 percent.
When the new system was instituted in 1997, it started with less than
30 percent of the EAP—in the same range as the old IVCM. However,
over the next 8 years the number of affiliates grew tremendously, both in
absolute numbers and as a percentage of the labor force (see Table 10-
1). By the end of 2006, 87 percent of the labor force was affiliated with
AFOREs, a remarkable figure considering the slow progress of coverage
over the previous 60 years.
Distribution of Unattached Accounts
A closer examination of the rapid growth of coverage reveals a different
picture. For example, from 2000 to 2001, the number of affiliates rose
from almost 18 million to more than 26.5 million, a steep rise. Table 10-
2 contains monthly data from December 2000 to December 2001. During
most months in this period, the number of affiliates did not rise more
than 2.5 percent—with one stark exception. In the month of June 2001
the number of affiliates rose a whopping 35 percent.
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Table 10-1 Affiliation and the Labor Force
End year Affiliates EAP a Affiliates/EAP a(%)
1997 11,188,144 38,584,394 29
1998 13,827,674 39,562,404 35
1999 15,594,503 39,648,333 39
2000 17,844,956 40,161,543 44
2001 26,518,534 40,072,856 66
2002 29,421,202 41,085,736 72
2003 31,398,282 41,515,672 76
2004 33,316,492 43,398,755 77
2005 35,276,277 41,880,800 84
2006 37,408,828 42,846,100 87
Sources: CONSAR and INEGI.
a EAP is an abbreviation for economically active population.
To see why, we have to go back to the regulatory changes that took
place in 1997, when the government allowed each worker to choose his or
her own AFORE. Many workers made no selection, so their accounts were
put into a separate ‘concentrated account’ (cuenta concentradora), admin-
istered by the Banco de Mexico (Mexican Central Bank). In June 2001,
the Bank announced that it would transfer these concentrated accounts
to the AFOREs by the end of the month. The Comisión Nacional del
Sistema de Ahorro para el Retiro (CONSAR) devised a formula for distrib-
uting these accounts to the 25 percent least expensive AFOREs. Congress
Table 10-2 Monthly Rise in Affiliates (12/00–12/01)
Month Affiliates Growth (%)
December 2000 17,844,956 1.28
January 2001 18,018,358 0.97
February 2001 18,221,289 1.13
March 2001 18,444,190 1.22
April 2001 18,657,474 1.16
May 2001 18,865,906 1.12
June 2001 25,555,664 35.46
July 2001 25,665,592 0.43
August 2001 26,297,659 2.46
September 2001 26,353,396 0.21
October 2001 26,417,113 0.24
November 2001 26,471,301 0.21
December 2001 26,518,534 0.18
Sources: CONSAR and IMSS.
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modified this formula in March 2007, stipulating that the assignment must
take into account not just the management fees but also the AFOREs’ rates
of return.
From 2002 to 2004, more than one-and-a-half million accounts were
distributed to the lowest cost AFOREs; during 2005 to 2006, another million
and a half accounts were distributed. Did these accounts have anything in
common? Most of them, as it turned out, had small balances along with low
density of contributions. Contributions to them had been sporadic, because
workers had either been working temporary jobs or switching back and
forth between the formal and informal sectors. Theoretically, each person
should have just one account, but evidence exists that several million work-
ers have more than one. Consequently, the number of accounts does not
necessarily correspond to the number of affiliates.
CONSAR’s tabulations also reveal that these accounts have had low den-
sity of contributions. Specifically, more than 85 percent of the assigned
affiliates have contributed less than 50 percent of the time. Given such
infrequency, these workers will never have enough money to retire.1
A closer study of these assigned accounts also reveals that the affiliates are
not necessarily receiving the lowest cost funds. The formula that CONSAR
devised to allocate affiliates ranked all funds according to their charges
for one year. However, the calculations do not account for the fact that
companies with the lowest charge for a year do not necessarily have the
lowest charges over longer periods—charges over a period of twenty-five
years might show a very different picture. For example, as Table 10-16
shows, Inbursa had the lowest equivalent charges on balance over one year
as of December 2006. However, if the period of affiliation goes up to twenty-
five years, the equivalent charge on the balance would make Inbursa one
of the more costly AFOREs. Given that affiliates tend to stick to default
options, these assignments can have important ramifications, even when
affiliates have the option to change their funds.
Affiliate Contributions
In addition to coverage, it is important for a pension system to achieve reg-
ular contributions by affiliates—an area where we see a divergence between
the number of affiliates and the number of contributors (see Table 10-3).
Soon after the 1997 reform, more than 60 percent of affiliates contributed
regularly to the system. However, this proportion has since fallen to less
than 40 percent. The number of regular contributors has stayed stubbornly
under fourteen million while the number of affiliates by the end of 2006
soared to over thirty-seven million, compared to the twelve million in the
old system in 1996. This sharp rise in the number of affiliates contrasts with
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Table 10-3 Affiliates versus Contributors (1997–2006)
Contributors (C) Affiliates (A) Ratio of C over A (%)
1997 7,769 11,188 69.0
1998 879,979 13,827,674 64.0
1999 948,855 15,594,503 61.0
2000 10,379,823 17,844,956 58.0
2001 11,864,672 26,518,534 45.0
2002 12,292,152 29,421,202 42.0
2003 12,660,999 31,398,282 40.3
2004 13,042,997 33,316,492 39.1
2005 13,557,086 35,276,277 38.4
2006 13,919,377 37,408,828 37.2
Sources: CONSAR and AMAFORE (Association of AFOREs).
the number of people contributing to the system. Specifically, the labor
force rose by over four million while contributors rose by two million, an
indicator that the informal sector is employing more people than is the
formal sector.
Table 10-4 shows that not all AFORE affiliates contribute at the same rate.
For example, Principal is one of the largest AFOREs in terms of affiliates,
with more than 3.3 million affiliates at the end of 2006. However, only 23.4
percent of its affiliates contribute, compared to 40.7 percent of Banamex
affiliates. Some AFOREs that started operations in 2006—such as Coppel
and Scotia—initially showed contribution rates of 100 percent. However,
these high rates were expected to diminish substantially over time.
Distribution of Funds
Table 10-5 provides the market share for each AFORE in terms of funds
rather than the number of affiliates or contributors for that year. Banamex
and Bancomer emerged as the largest AFOREs in 1997 and continue to
dominate the market.
Table 10-6 shows how much money each affiliate had on average in
each AFORE in December 2006. To allow comparison across countries, the
figures are expressed in US dollars. The large funds—Bancomer, Banamex,
Inbursa, ING, and Profuturo—have the largest balances on average per
affiliate. Large AFOREs seem to contain a larger proportion of affili-
ates contributing regularly, suggesting that bigger funds have managed
to attract clients with more consistent employment. Newer funds are also
showing large balances, which will decline over time as their proportion of
contributors fall.
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Table 10-4 Affiliates versus Contributors (2006)
AFORE Total Registered % of Contributing
Actinver 1,248,442 35.2
Afirme Bajío 422,615 55.2
Ahorra Ahora 155,942 65.8
Argosa No account yet n/a
Azteca 1,270,951 41.3
Banamex 5,596,232 40.7
Bancomer 4,255,568 41.4
Banorte Generali 3,282,539 37.9
Coppel 203,834 62.5
De la Genteb 21 100.0
HSBC 1,767,775 41.7
Inbursa 3,630,280 37.4
ING 2,314,651 30.3
Invercap 833,415 57.7
Ixe 184,673 36.5
Metlife 112,833 88.7
Principal 3,326,545 23.4
Profuturo GNP 3,403,090 40.3
Santander 2,996,067 31.9
Scotiac 673 100.0
XXI 2,402,682 20.8
Total 37,408,828 36.8
Sources: Various.
Note: Figures are for December 31, 2006.
a Argos started operations on December 7, 2006.
b De la Gente started operations on November 15, 2006.
c Scotia started operations on November 1, 2006.
Examining all AFOREs that existed at the end of 2006 in terms of contrib-
utors rather than affiliates reveals that the average balance per contributor
is US$4,625,2 compared to US$1,721 for an average account balance for
all affiliates. This nearly threefold increase in balances is not surprising
given that there are almost three times as many affiliates as contributors
(as shown in Table 10-3).
Number of Companies
The number of pension fund firms has fluctuated over the past decade.
Out of the initial forty-four applicants, seventeen started operating when
the system was inaugurated in July 1997; fifteen were operating in 2005. Five
new funds have been given permission to operate during 2006: Coppel, de
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Table 10-5 Market Share for Each AFORE (in %) (2001–6)
AFORE 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Actinver 0 0 0 0 1 3
Afirme Bajío — — — — — 1
Ahorra Ahora — — — — — 0
Allianz Dresdner 4 4 3 0 0 0
Argos — — — — — 0
Azteca 0 0 0 1 1 3
Banamex Aegon 15 24 23 22 21 15
Bancomer 22 22 21 20 20 11
Banorte Generali 6 6 6 7 7 9
Coppel — — — — — 1
De la Gente — — — — — 0
HSBC 0 0 0 4 4 5
Garante 9 0 0 0 0 0
Inbursa 7 7 7 8 9 10
ING 9 9 9 10 9 6
INVERCAP 0 0 0 0 0 2
IXE 0 0 0 0 0 0
METLIFE 0 0 0 0 0 0
Principal 2 3 4 4 5 9
Profuturo GNP 10 10 10 10 10 9
Santander Mexicano 9 9 9 8 8 8
Scotia — — — — — 0
Tepeyac 1 1 0 0 0 0
XXI 6 6 7 6 6 6
Zurich 1 0 0 0 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: CONSAR.
Note: A figure of 0% may mean that the AFORE did not exist for that particular year.
la Gente, Ahorra Ahora, Scotia, and Argos. The total number of AFOREs is
now twenty-one. At the end of 2005 Metlife was given permission to operate.
Originally, each AFORE was allowed to have only one investment portfo-
lio (known as a Sociedad de Inversion en Fondos de Retiro, or SIEFORE)
(see Table 10-7). Starting in 1999, AFOREs could offer funds for volun-
tary contributions (with tax breaks added in 2003). The larger companies
Banamex, Bancomer, and Profuturo were the first to do so. Then in 2004
AFOREs were allowed a second SIEFORE, and investment funds followed
suit. Basic SIEFORE 2 has a less restrictive investment regime than does
Basic SIEFORE 1. While each fund can invest in stocks and foreign debt
instruments, they cannot do so directly. Rather, they must invest using
derivative instruments (or structured notes) as long as the principal is
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Table 10-6 Balance in Each Fund (2006)
Fund Amount (thousands of US$) Affiliates $ per Affiliate
Actinver 797,936 1,248,442 639
Afirme Bajío 150,086 422,615 355
Ahorra Ahora 7,000 155,942 45
Argos — —
Azteca 1,364,866 1,270,951 1,074
Banamex 11,970,446 5,596,232 2,139
Bancomer 10,923,333 4,255,568 2,567
Banorte Generali 4,484,208 3,282,539 1,366
Coppel 48,532 203,834 238
De la Gente 331 21 15,762
HSBC 2,628,937 1,767,775 1,487
Inbursa 7,682,668 3,630,280 2,116
ING 4,589,110 2,314,651 1,983
Invercap 826,684 833,415 992
Ixe 240,327 184,673 1,301
Metlife 974,294 112,833 8,635
Principal 2,854,169 3,326,545 858
Profuturo GNP 6,758,434 3,403,090 1,986
Santander 4,240,470 2,996,067 1,415
Scotia 7,704 673 11,448
XXI 3,824,206 2,402,682 1,592
Total 64,373,740 37,408,828 1,721
Source: CONSAR.
Notes: The table does not include INFONAVIT funds. Rate of exchange is 11.1MXP per
US dollar.
Table 10-7 Types of Funds at the End of Each Year
Year Basic Voluntary Basic
Year SIEFORE 1 SIEFOREs SIEFORE 2
1998 17 n/a n/a
1999 14 3 n/a
2000 13 3 n/a
2001 13 3 n/a
2002 11 3 n/a
2003 12 3 n/a
2004 13 3 13
2005 15 3 15
2006 17 6 17
Source: CONSAR.
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Table 10-8 Evolution of Market Share of Number of Affiliates (%) (1997–2000)
Fund 02/1997 07/1997 12/1997 12/1998 06/1999 06/2000
Atlantico 0.00 1.38 1.77 1.03 * *
Banamex 31.31 16.12 12.23 11.34 11.65 12.24
Bancomer 28.28 22.23 16.76 16.10 15.85 16.06
Bancrecer 0.06 4.07 4.67 4.39 4.22 3.90
Bital 4.00 9.84 9.20 9.44 9.92 10.20
Capitaliza 0.00 0.07 * * * *
Garante 0.78 8.32 10.96 11.09 11.00 10.83
Genesis 0.04 0.67 1.06 * * *
Inbursa 0.49 2.62 2.63 2.68 2.58 2.36
Previnter 0.04 2.07 2.33 * * *
Principal 0.00 0.48 0.61 2.18 2.89 2.88
Profuturo 16.03 11.79 12.55 13.96 13.57 12.62
Santander 13.99 12.46 14.73 14.24 13.79 13.99
SBNa 4.99 4.89 6.76 8.61 8.49 8.82
Tepeyac 0.00 0.52 0.85 1.02 1.42 1.69
XXI 0.00 2.22 2.71 3.06 3.09 3.14
Zurich 0.00 0.25 0.18 0.86 1.24 1.27
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: CONSAR.
Note: An asterisk (*) indicates that the fund ceased to exist independently.
a SBN = Solida Banorte Generali.
protected. (Very few AFOREs have used this instrument.) In addition, only
workers who are younger than 55 years can participate in them.
Table 10-8 shows the evolution of market share in the first four years
of the operation of the new privatized pension system. (Some funds, like
Atlantico, Genesis, Previnter, Tepeyac, and Zurich, never captured signifi-
cant market share and folded.) In an effort to ensure a competitive market,
CONSAR stipulated that the market share of any AFORE could not exceed
17 percent of affiliates. However, using headcounts rather than portfolio
value is a misguided way to enforce competition, given the wide range
in account balances. For example, Bancomer had 21.7 percent of total
affiliates, thus temporarily exceeding the market share limit imposed by
CONSAR. Table 10-9 shows that the top 4 firms had nearly 54 percent of
the market in 2002, but by December 2006 their share had fallen somewhat
to 45.60 percent.
Distribution of Contributors
It is critical to know the distribution of the contributors in terms of salary
levels because ultimately what retirees will receive depends on what they
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Table 10-9 Evolution of Market Share (%) (2002–6)
AFORE 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Actinver * 1.24 2.21 2.51 3.4
Afirme Bajío * * * * 1.1
Allianz 4.28 3.92 * * *
Ahorra Ahora * * * * 0.4
Argos * * * * *
Azteca * 1.42 2.47 2.84 3.4
Banamex 17.91 17.87 17.48 16.93 15.1
Bancomer 14.8 13.79 12.98 12.67 11.5
Banorte 8.87 8.87 8.71 8.67 8.8
HSBC * * 4.3 4.66 4.8
Garante * * * * *
Coppel * * * * 0.5
De la Gente * * * * 0.0
Inbursa 6.57 6.76 7.54 8.07 9.8
ING 9.21 8.57 7.88 7.4 6.2
Invercap * * * 0.36 2.2
IXE * * 0.49 0.54 0.5
MetLife * * * 0.04 0.3
Principal 7.47 10.22 9.69 9.63 9.0
Profuturo GNP 9.95 9.95 10.09 10.06 9.2
Santander 11 10.33 9.53 9.06 8.1
Scotia * * * * 0.0
Tepeyac 3.2 * * * *
XXI 6.74 7.07 6.64 6.57 6.5
Zurich * * * * *
Top 4 53.66 52.21 50.63 48.72 45.60
Source: CONSAR.
Notes: For each year during 2001–6, percentages are measured
at the end of December. An asterisk (*) indicates that the fund
does not exist independently. The potential market estimated by
CONSAR as of December 2006 is US$36,097,411.
contribute. Table 10-10 shows that in 2005 nearly 33 percent of contributors
earned less than 2 times the minimum salary, and almost 55 percent earned
less than 3 times the minimum salary. At 5.5 percent of the minimum salary,
the government contribution for the majority of contributors is therefore
significant.
AFORE Transfers
Table 10-11 shows the transfers that have occurred each year as a per-
centage of the number of affiliates. In 1998 only 0.03 percent of affiliates
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Table 10-10 Distribution of Contributors by
Salary Level (2005)
Salary Contributors Percentage
0 to 1 153,674 1.20
1 to 2 4,179,468 32.67
2 to 3 2,820,322 22.05
3 to 4 1,592,271 12.45
4 to 5 999,463 7.81
5 to 6 700,488 5.48
6 to 7 443,700 3.47
7 to 8 362,324 2.83
8 to 9 254,860 1.99
9 to 10 183,627 1.44
10 to 11 145,153 1.13
11 to 12 125,036 0.98
13 or more 832,295 6.51
Total 12,792,681 100.00
Source: IMSS.
Note: Salary is expressed in multiples of minimum salary.
transferred, but by 2006 a substantial 9.15 percent had. If we calculate the
transfers as a percentage of contributors, nearly one in four contributors
have transferred from one AFORE to another. The number of transfers
is gaining momentum now that the process has since been simplified and
the penalty for moving from one fund to another has been reduced to a
minimum.
Table 10-11 Transfers as a Percentage of Affiliates (1998–2006)
Year Transfers Affiliates Percentage of
Affiliates
Transferred
Contributors Percentage of
Contributors
Transferred
1998 3,535 13,827,674 0.03 879,979 0.40
1999 44,038 15,594,503 0.28 948,855 4.64
2000 91,653 17,844,956 0.51 10,379,823 0.88
2001 106,220 26,518,534 0.40 11,864,672 0.90
2002 120,089 29,421,202 0.41 12,292,152 0.98
2003 420,791 31,398,282 1.34 12,577,265 3.35
2004 1,199,293 33,316,492 3.60 12,751,029 9.41
2005 2,819,444 35,276,277 7.99 13,557,086 20.80
2006 3,423,554 37,408,828 9.15 13,919,377 24.60
Source: CONSAR.
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Table 10-12 Pension Funds in 2001
AFORE SIEFORE Value Share
Allianz Dresdner Allianz Dresdner I-1 8,930.9 3.6
Banamex Aegon Banamex No. 1 36,997.0 14.9
Bancomer Bancomer Real 53,843.8 21.7
Banorte Generali Fondo Sólida Banorte Generali 14,092.1 5.7
Garante Garante 1 21,598.9 8.7
Inbursa Inbursa 18,327.4 7.4
ING ING 21,430.1 8.6
Principal Principal 6,081.3 2.5
Profuturo GNP Fondo Profuturo 23,648.6 9.5
Santander Mexicano Ahorro Santander Mexicano 22,605.5 9.1
Tepeyac Tepeyac 2,825.9 1.1
XXI XXI 15,472.0 6.2
Zurich Zurich 2,322.5 0.9
Total 248,176.1 100.0
Source: Notisar (2001). (Notisar was a precursor of CONSAR.)
Where are affiliates moving? A report by CONSAR suggests that over
80 percent are moving to cheaper AFOREs in terms of fees, and nearly 20
percent are moving in the opposite direction. There are two possible rea-
sons why an affiliate might go to a more expensive fund. First, the costlier
funds might be offering higher returns. Second, they may be offering better
service. Of course, there may be a third reason: the expensive funds may be
marketing their AFOREs more successfully.
Portfolios of AFOREs
When AFOREs first formed, they were allowed to have one SIEFORE each,
and they had to have most of their investments in short-term government
bonds. However, over the past eight years, the investment regimen has
been relaxed. Table 10-12 shows the market share of each fund in 2001. As
noted earlier, the market share according to the value of each AFORE does
not correspond to the market share according to the number of affiliates.
For example, while Bancomer had less than 13 percent of the affiliates, it
controlled 21 percent of the market with respect to investments.
Table 10-13, which shows the investment profile for each AFORE in
2006, reveals that over 75 percent of all investment was in government
bonds, largely in an indexed, short-term bond called Bonde 91. Private-
bond investment was 8 percent of the total, lower than what was actually
allowed by law, even though private bonds had much higher rates of return.
The reason private-bond investment is low is because investment was only
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Table 10-13 Investment Profile (2006)
AFORE SIEFORE Value Share Govt. Private Bank Othersa
Actinver Actinver 1 2,381.3 3.32 94.3 0.7 1.5 3.5
Afirme Bajío Afirme Bajío
Siefore Básica 1
502.3 0.70 87.2 — 3.3 9.5
Ahorra Ahora Ahorra Ahora 1 109.4 0.15 96.7 — — 3.3
Argos Argos 1 9.5 0.01 100.0 — — —
Azteca Azteca Básica 1 2,397.2 3.34 84.5 5.5 2.1 7.9
Banamex Banamex
Básica 1
8,105.8 11.29 76.7 4.9 4.9 13.5
Bancomer Bancomer
Protege
10,175.7 14.17 76.9 12.8 3.3 7.1
Banorte Generali Fondo Sólida
Banorte
Generali Uno
4,051.7 5.64 67.0 10.8 11.5 10.8
Coppel Coppel Básica 1 147.6 0.21 74.8 9.3 9.2 6.6
De la Gente De la Gente
Básica 1
22.7 0.03 93.2 — — 6.8
HSBC HSBC-B1 3,025.5 4.21 85.3 7.6 3.8 3.3
Inbursa Inbursa Básica 11,218.1 15.62 88.7 4.5 1.9 4.8
ING ING Básica 1 4,493.0 6.26 70.0 8.5 9.0 12.5
Invercap Invercap 1,143.3 1.59 34.4 22.3 22.5 20.7
Ixe Ixe 1 462.5 0.64 93.0 — 4.5 2.5
Metlife Metlife Met1 627.3 0.87 67.9 8.0 12.8 11.3
Principal Principal 1 7,120.3 9.91 75.7 8.2 5.6 10.5
Profuturo GNP Fondo
Profuturo1
4,927.9 6.86 51.8 12.3 12.7 23.2
Santander Ahorro
Santander
Básica 1
3,961.9 5.52 74.7 8.0 4.6 12.7
Scotia Scotia Siefore
Básica 1
23.6 0.03 91.0 — 6.0 3.1
XXI XXI SB1 6,918.9 9.63 65.7 8.3 14.4 11.7
Total — 71,825.4 100.00 75.3 8.1 6.4 10.2
Source: CONSAR.
a Includes government papers and instruments issued by states, municipalities, and
government-related companies, as well as international papers.
possible in mxAAA- or better-rated private bonds, which are in short
supply.
Thus, by 2006, AFOREs had reduced their holdings of government
bonds from 88 to 75 percent, a proportion similar to that in El Salvador
and Uruguay but much larger than in Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile.
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Table 10-14a Accumulated Funds in AFOREs (2006)
AFORE Obligatory Voluntary Voluntary/
Obligatory (%)
Actinver 4,648.3 29.6 0.64
Afirme Bajío 6.2 0.1 0.80
Azteca 8,637.2 6.4 0.07
Banamex 114,721.9 462.1 0.40
Bancomer 109,159.7 499.5 0.46
Banorte Generali 38,274.7 114.3 0.30
HSBC 24,973.5 18.3 0.07
Inbursa 61,171.6 201.8 0.33
ING 47,154.0 81.2 0.17
Invercap 1,798.3 0.9 0.05
IXE 1,206.9 4.0 0.33
Metlife 4,206.0 8.3 0.20
Principal 26,369.4 18.2 0.07
Profuturo GNP 57,462.8 169.6 0.30
Santander Mexicano 42,467.9 72.5 0.17
XXI 34,750.3 309.8 0.89
Total 577,008.7 1,996.5 0.35
Source: CONSAR.
Notes: Figures are in thousands of pesos. Includes only retirement funds.
Voluntary Contributions
Since 2003 affiliates have been able to invest in one of two voluntary
funds. They can invest beyond the 6.5 percent of salary stipulated by law
in the AFORE accounts that they already have or in a separate voluntary
account (discussed above). Tables 10-14a and 10.14b examine additional
voluntary contributions in the existing obligatory accounts. For the system
as a whole, the voluntary contribution is very small: only 0.3 percent of total
contribution comes as voluntary contributions.
What are the benefits of the separate voluntary fund? Because contribu-
tions are tax-deductible up to a limit, this segment was created to encourage
workers to save more for retirement. Under current law workers can with-
draw the funds after 6 months with a penalty of 20 percent tax payment,
which means that individuals with a higher than 20 percent marginal tax
rate can use this fund to reduce their tax burden.
Cost of the New System
There are different ways to examine the new system’s costs:
1. At the basic level are the commissions charged by AFOREs.
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Table 10-14b Investment Regimes of Voluntary Accounts (2006)
Fund Value Percentage Government
Bonds
Financial
Institutions
Actinver 3 57.5 8.96 93.1 —
Banamex de Aportaciones
Voluntarias
198.2 30.92 100.0 —
Banamex de Aportaciones
Voluntarias Plus
0.7 0.10 100.0 —
Ahorro Individual Bancomer 235.5 36.72 100.0 —
ING AV3 23.0 3.59 92.6 6.0
Metlife Met3 30.4 4.74 100.0 —
Fondo Profuturo 2 93.9 14.65 89.0 0.4
Fondo Profuturo 3 2.1 0.32 100.0 —
Total 641.2 100.00 97.5 0.3
Source: CONSAR.
Notes: Figures are in millions of pesos. Investment portfolios are expressed as a percentage
of total.
2. At the macro level is the cost of transitioning from the old to the new.
The introduction of the new system means that those now receiving
benefits under the old system will not be contributing. Consequently,
substantial resources must be allocated to these retirees.
3. The new system also promises a floor plan. Those who would not have
enough in their account under the new system will receive a minimum
guaranteed pension.
Commissions
Commissions can be assessed over the flow of funds, on account balances,
and over the rate of return. In 1997 most funds charged commissions on
flow. Some funds charged on both the flow of funds and account balance.
Inbursa charged only on the real rate of return, not charging anything if
the real rate was negative. However, in 2000 Inbursa changed its commis-
sion structure. As the current structure stands, the commissions are not
constant over time; they vary with the number of years an affiliate stays in
the fund. AFOREs offer a discount for loyalty, which can accumulate for 25
years or more, depending on the fund.
Because charges are assessed differently from AFORE to AFORE, it is not
easy to compare charges. Table 10-15 illustrates the charges as advertised
by each fund. In 2006 each AFORE charged on flow (contribution) and,
in most cases, on the balance as well. Principal, for example, charged 1.6
percent of wages and an additional 0.35 percent on the account balance.
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Table 10-15. Commission Structure (2006)
AFORE Commission on
Contribution
Commission on
Balance
Actinver 1.02 0.20
Afirme Bajío 0.62 0.24
Ahorra Ahora 0.90 0.20
Argos 1.07 0.33
Azteca 0.90 0.40
Banamex 0.75 1.48
Bancomer 1.20 0.50
Banorte Generali 1.25 0.40
Coppel 0.92 0.30
De la Gente 0.90 0.31
HSBC 1.40 0.40
Inbursa 0.50 0.50
ING 1.32 0.30
Invercap 1.03 0.20
IXE 1.10 0.33
Metlife 1.23 0.25
Principal 1.60 0.35
Profuturo GNP 1.64 0.50
Santander 1.28 0.50
Scotia 1.22 0.26
XXI 1.30 0.20
Source: CONSAR.
Note: Charges are expressed as a percentage of income in
the case of contribution and on the balance in the last
column.
For each additional year, an affiliate stays with Principal, these charges are
reduced. With such a fee structure, it is clearly no easy task to compare the
charges across AFOREs, although some direct comparison is possible.
In general, commission charges on balances increase over time as affil-
iates accumulate more wealth. For example, XXI charges lower commis-
sions than does Profuturo on both contributions and balances. Thus, we
can clearly rank XXI above Profuturo in terms of commissions. Using the
same criterion, we can rank Actinver over XXI. However, given the variable
discount structures of fees, any comparison must be specific to scenarios
that depend on many factors, including initial balance, base wage, wage
growth rate, interest rates over time, and inflation rate. Sinha, Martinez,
and Barrios (1999) performed such a comparison using different scenarios
in Mexico. However, because the number of AFOREs has changed over
time, such calculations are moving targets.
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To get an idea how much an affiliate pays in commissions, consider the
following simple example. Suppose that a person earns the average wage
(around 3 times the legal minimum wage in Mexico) and pays the 6.5
percent contribution to his or her retirement fund. Banamex would charge
1.68 percent of salary. Therefore, as a percentage of contribution, the
charges would amount to 25.85 percent (1.68/6.5). However, it would be
wrong to assign 25.85 percent as charges because there is the social quota—
5.5 percent of minimum wage—that must also be considered. For this
worker, who earns three times the minimum wage, the social quota would
amount to 1.83 percent (5.5/3) of salary. This person’s actual contribution
is 6.5% + 1.83% = 8.33%. By law, charges do not apply to the social quota, so
the actual charges amount to 20.17 percent (1.68/8.33) of the flow. Further
complicating the picture is the discount AFOREs give depending on the
number of years a worker stays with a fund, which means that this charge
would fall over time. Flores (2004) devised a crude calculation showing
that commissions as a fraction of contributions averaged around 19 percent
during 1999–2004.
CONSAR provides information from each AFORE on how much they
will charge in the form of an equivalent to a percentage of salary (but
not as a percentage of contribution). Table 10-16 shows that, for some
AFOREs, equivalent commissions rise over time. Others, like Banamex, fall
over time because they charge only on flow, and this amount decreases as an
affiliate stays with Banamex. The complexity of the charges makes a simple
rule of thumb useless. Consider the following example. For Actinver, the
commission equivalent first falls and then rises. For Profuturo, on the other
hand, the commission equivalent keeps rising as a percentage of base salary.
However, it is impossible to guess such outcomes simply by examining the
fees structures.
In 2004 CONSAR emphasized how charges are falling over time, adver-
tising it as a triumph of free market competition (Budebo 2004). For exam-
ple, Pineda (2005) quotes Budebo, saying that this dramatic fall can be
ascribed both to more competition among AFOREs and to the regulatory
change that has allowed easier movement from AFORE to AFORE. The
claim behind CONSAR’s reports of falling charges is flawed for several
reasons. First, the average charges reported are not for the date on which
it is reported. Specifically, charges reported in Figure 10-1 for January 2002
do not apply during January 2002. Rather, they are the average charges
that would apply (expressed as an equivalent of charges on the balance) if
the affiliate were to stay with the same AFORE for the next 25 years. Thus,
a new entrant to the system in January 2002 would pay much more than
Figure 10-1 reports.
Second, as the law stood in January 2002, jumping from one AFORE to
another meant that an affiliate would lose the discount for staying with the
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Table 10-16. Commission Equivalent as a Percentage of Base Salary (2006)
Fund 1 Year 5 Years 10 Years 20 Years 25 Years
Actinver 0.94 0.95 0.94 0.99 1.05
Afirme Bajío 0.73 0.76 0.80 0.91 0.96
Ahorra Ahora 0.95 0.93 0.92 0.97 1.02
Argos 1.23 1.21 1.20 1.20 1.24
Azteca 0.94 1.00 1.01 0.97 0.98
Banamex 1.16 1.10 1.10 1.05 1.07
Bancomer 0.95 1.05 1.18 1.27 1.37
Banorte Generali 1.14 1.19 1.26 1.41 1.50
Coppel 1.06 1.12 1.20 1.34 1.42
De la Gente 1.05 1.11 1.19 1.34 1.41
HSBC 1.47 1.47 1.43 1.32 1.27
Inbursa 0.74 0.84 0.98 1.15 1.26
ING 1.43 1.39 1.38 1.39 1.47
Invercap 1.05 1.05 1.06 1.10 1.13
Ixe 1.16 1.17 1.18 1.27 1.34
Metlife 1.29 1.30 1.29 1.26 1.29
Principal 1.68 1.67 1.65 1.61 1.62
Profuturo GNP 1.41 1.50 1.63 1.81 1.91
Santander 1.52 1.45 1.33 1.33 1.42
Scotia 1.28 1.33 1.40 1.32 1.35
XXI 1.40 1.40 1.40 1.44 1.47
Simple average 1.17 1.19 1.21 1.26 1.31
Source: CONSAR.
Note: These figures are calculated for a person earning average salary with a real rate of
return of 5%.
same AFORE. Thus, any movement would have meant a higher charge. If
changing a provider causes a person to pay higher fees, in what sense would
the standard argument of price competition apply? However, a 2004 change
in law removed penalties for workers who switch but stay in the system, but
every new entrant still must pay the highest possible fee of that AFORE.
Third, the average charges do not take into account the number of
affiliates in each AFORE. Thus, a new AFORE gets the same weight as the
established old AFOREs with millions of accounts. In reality, the average
charges are not falling that rapidly for the affiliates and the charges will
only be as reported in Figure 10-1 over a period of twenty-five years if there
are no new entrants to the system.
What this all means is that charges with the discount do not apply to the
time frame they refer to, and it is therefore not possible to compare these
charges with other countries, as other countries do not report them in the
prospective basis of the next twenty-five years.
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Figure 10-1. Reported average charges (01/02–08/04) (Source: CONSAR).
On March 29, 2007, Congress passed a law making charges on flow ille-
gal. If the law is not overturned in the courts by an AFORE legal challenge,
the structure of management fees will change dramatically.
Transition Costs
Moving from the old to the new system requires payment to two popu-
lations: (a) all the people owed benefits under the old system, and (b)
all the affiliates under the new system who would not have accumulated
enough capital in their savings accounts to receive a pension equal to one
minimum wage (as determined in July 1997). Note that CONSAR forecasts
assume a 5 percent annual real rate of return, as well as a flat 5 percent
real rate of return. The forecasts concerning transition costs also require
a rate of growth of wages over time as well as the rate of growth of real
GDP.
CONSAR reported two series of payments over the next fifty years. A
close look at the series shows that the cost is higher during the first two
decades of the reform, then it falls below the forecast without the reform.
Without reform, the cost is low at the beginning and gradually rises over
the decades (see Sinha 2005). The only way to compare these numbers is to
convert the series into their present values. However, we have no clear guide
to choosing the discount rates. Table 10-17 reports the present value with
different discount rates. Strikingly, for any discount rate above 3 percent,
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Table 10-17. Present Value of Cost Without and With
Reform
Discount Rate (%) Without Reform With Reform
0 $10,679.41 $4,462.17
3 1,965.85 1,984.38
6 776.09 1,338.12
10 361.55 690.01
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on CONSAR’s figures.
the present value of cost without reform is lower than the present value
of cost with reform. This raises an important question: Was the reform
financially a necessary one from a macroeconomic point of view? Casal and
Hoyo (2007) recalculate the cost of the reform. They show that under a
discount rate of 3.5 percent the transition seems to save around 20 percent
of GDP. Since they assume a different discount rate (3.5%) and consider
a different number of years (starting in 2006 and ending in 2090), the
information that Table 10-17 presents is not strictly comparable.
Cost of the Guarantees
As noted above, the government offers two kinds of guarantees. First, for
the transition workers (those who joined the system before July 1, 1997),
the government guarantees that if an annuity bought by the affiliate using
the AFORE balance does not exceed what he or she would have received
under the old regime, the affiliate can choose to retire under the old
regime. In this context, Feldstein (2005: 47–8) notes the incentive problem
this guarantee creates:
The notoriously high administrative costs in some Latin American countries reflect
an incentive structure that causes individuals to disregard costs when choosing
among plans.. . . Since someone who was 50 years old or older when the new system
began could not possibly accumulate more in his investment account than he would
be entitled to under the old rules, the cost and return in the personal accounts was
irrelevant. Any promotional gift or other incentive to choose a particular plan or to
change plans could therefore draw individuals to a high cost plan.
This guarantee does not apply to affiliates who join on or after July 1,
1997. However, these workers have a different guarantee: they will receive
at least the equivalent of one minimum salary prevailing on July 1, 1997,
adjusted for inflation. This guarantee amounts to a floor value of the new
pension plans under the AFOREs. From the government’s point of view,
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MPG VT
Pa
yo
ff
Figure 10-2. MPG as an option. (Source: authors’ own calculation.)
this guarantee is equivalent to a standard put option, where the strike value
is the MPG offered by the government. If the accumulated value is such that
it amounts to a life annuity of the minimum pension, the government has
zero liability. However, as Figure 10-2 illustrates, if the accumulated amount
is less than what would amount to a minimum salary, the government has
to make up the deficit.
Will the government have to chip in to make good the promise? Obvi-
ously, the answer to this will depend on the income levels of the affiliates.
Intuitively, if affiliates have high incomes, the money in their accounts
would be sufficient to pay for the minimum pension. To get a feel for the
rate of return required at each level of salary, we calculated that rate for
three different levels of salary for workers with contributions over twenty-
five years—the minimum period of contribution to have the right to the
MPG (see Table 10-18). For workers earning one minimum salary, the
required real rate of return is 14 percent annually. For workers earning
twice the minimum salary, the required rate of return is still 11.6 percent.
For workers with the economywide average salary of 3 times the minimum
salary, the required rate of return is 9.8 percent. To put it differently, it is
likely that for more than half the people in the system, the government will
have to top up the minimum pension, as promised under the new system.
At present, no provision is being made for such financial contingencies in
the government budget.
So far, we have not addressed the variability of the rate of return, nor
the question about the likelihood of the government stepping in (from a
probabilistic point of view). The next section explores this question further.
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Table 10-18. Return Required to Receive the MPG
Multiples of
Minimum Wage
RRR a
1 14.0
2 11.6
3 9.8
Source: CONSAR.
Note: Calculations are based on twenty-five years of contribu-
tions, with the assumption that a married couple receives the
benefits, and the wife is five years younger than the husband.
a Required rate of return.
Investment Regimes
This section explores investment regimes in more detail, including how
they have changed over time and how Mexico’s investment regime com-
pares with those in other countries.
Returns versus Fees
Do charges in different AFOREs justify their higher fees? Some AFOREs
have argued that their higher charges are justified because they offer
higher returns. As noted earlier, the charges are moving targets. However,
this exercise takes the average charges of each AFORE over a period of
twenty-five years. Because not all AFOREs have been around since 1997—
making it difficult to compare performances—we consider only those that
have been in existence since the beginning. Figure 10-3, which plots the
twenty-five-year commission for each AFORE against its gross real rate of
return over the past eight years, shows a positive relationship between
charges and returns. It is clear that higher rates of return are associated
with AFOREs with higher fees.
Does that mean that affiliates should be happier with the AFOREs that
charge more because they get higher rates of return? The real issue is
whether the extra return more than compensates for the higher fees. The
answer is no. Any additional benefits offered in the form of higher returns
are more than offset by higher fees. Each percentage point rise in rate of
return requires a 50 percent rise in fees. Affiliates clearly would be better
off by staying with the AFOREs that charge the lowest fees. Moreover, the
higher returns also come with higher risks (Sinha 2002). Note that the fund
with the lowest fee depends on the specific circumstances of the affiliates:
salary level, growth of salary, time spent in the system, and real rate of
return all can affect the value of the benefits.
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Figure 10-3. Relation between commissions and returns of the AFOREs.
(Source: authors’ own calculation.)
Structured Notes
In 2004, a new investment regime for the AFOREs took effect. With the
new regime, AFOREs can now invest in domestic and foreign stock market
indexes along with derivative instruments (they cannot invest directly in
derivatives). Specifically, AFOREs can have two separate portfolios for each
affiliate. The first portfolio is more conservative than the second, which can
be invested not only in bonds but also stocks along with derivatives. Only
workers aged 55 or younger are eligible to choose Fund 2, and there are
restrictions on the investments in the stock markets. The AFOREs have to
ensure that such investments guarantee the value of the principal. In other
words, if 100 pesos are invested, the maximum that an affiliate can lose is
the return earned over 100 pesos. This regime is called ‘structured notes’.
Perhaps because of the complexity, the AFOREs have not invested more
than 1 percent of their portfolio in structured notes.
Payout Phase
The success of any pension system depends on how well it delivers benefits.
Therefore, it is critical to examine how the payout phase is functioning.
The system in Mexico is still immature, so it is not possible to see all the
elements of the payout phase. Nevertheless, examining the basic building
blocks of the payout phase can be revealing. This section examines the
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Table 10-19. Number of Annuities
Authorized by IMSS
Year Total Number
1997 4,213
1998 23,257
1999 24,680
2000 27,108
2001 30,621
2002 15,361
2003 5,798
2004 6,124
2005 7,921
2006 7,828
Source: AMIS.
annuities markets, the results of the different rates of contribution for men
and women, and future risks of insufficient money in the AFOREs.
Annuities Markets
The development of an annuities market is a critical element of any private
system. When the new system began, the IMSS was supposed to buy a
single premium annuity for everyone who became eligible. The rules stated
that eligible workers would solicit offers from among the dozen insurance
companies who offered the annuities. The eligible worker would then pick
an offer, which would be communicated to the IMSS, who would then
authorize a single premium for the annuity. To make the deal attractive,
insurance companies offered various additional benefits.
Table 10-19 shows the number of people who became eligible. There
were 4,213 annuities during 1997, the first year. By 2001, this number
had reached 30,621. Approximately half of the benefits were authorized to
persons with total and permanent disabilities. Another half of the benefits
were authorized to widows and orphans of affiliates.
Something peculiar began to happen in 2002. Instead of rising, as we
would expect with a maturing system, the number of authorized annu-
ities started to fall dramatically, then seems to have stabilized after 2003.
The reason for this unexpected decrease lies with the rules of annuities
authorization. During the first four years, the IMSS authorized annuities
without any delay. However, starting in 2002, the agency introduced a two-
year probationary period for most cases. This meant that for the short run,
the IMSS would not make a large single premium payment on behalf of
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Figure 10-4. Average salary of women in AFOREs (08/1997–02/2005).
(Source: authors’ own calculation.)
these annuitants to the firms selling annuities. Rather, they simply made
the payment themselves to eligible individuals from its current budget on a
PAYGO basis. Given that the IMSS had lost a major segment of its income
stream after the introduction of individual accounts, it has sought various
ways to reduce current expenditures. Many observers in the industry see
this clampdown as a direct result of such belt-tightening.
The Gender Issue
In many countries, women, on average, earn less than men. Mexico is no
exception. CONSAR made a special tabulation of salaries of all persons
who have contributed regularly during 1997–2005 (the tabulation excludes
everyone who has contributed to their AFOREs only intermittently), sep-
arating them by gender. Figure 10-4 displays the average salary of men as
100 percent and calculates the average salary of women for each 2 months.
During the 8 years, the average salary of women fluctuated between 75 and
80 percent of the average salary of men, which implies that at best, the
average pension for women would be no larger than the corresponding
average pension of men. In fact, the pension would be lower, as women
have greater longevity. The annuity women can buy will take into account
their greater longevity and therefore pay lower benefits per year, on the
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order of another 20 percent. Ultimately, this means that women with the
same contribution density as men will receive a 40 percent smaller pension.
Likelihood of Future Shortfalls
The section above that discussed the cost of the guarantees examined how
a number of affiliates (depending on their level of salary) would end up
without enough capital in their accounts to ensure a minimum salary. In
this section, we report the results of Sinha and Renteria (2006), who discuss
the likelihood of this shortfall depending on investment patterns and levels
of salary. The results of this study are discussed below.
This exercise requires that we make a number of assumptions about the
investment regimes. We consider only AFOREs that can invest in different
proportions in stocks and bonds without restrictions, and assume that the
future rates of return of the stocks and bonds in Mexico (in real terms) will
follow exactly the same pattern as during the past 8 years.
Suppose the affiliate (male with a wife four years younger) spends forty
years in the system. The results show that if this affiliate has less than
two times the minimum salary and if his or her investment regime allows
investment only in Mexican government bonds, the likelihood that he will
not have at least a minimum salary equivalent of retirement benefits is
equal to one. This likelihood falls rapidly as the proportion of investment
in the stock market rises.
If we repeat this exercise for an affiliate with 25 years in the system and an
income of less than 2 times the minimum wage, we find that the likelihood
of this person’s not having enough to get the minimum guarantee is higher
than 50 percent for all levels of investment in the stock market. Thus,
amplification of the investment regime is unlikely to solve the problem
for low-income individuals. It is realistic to assume that many low-income
individuals will not spend the required minimum of twenty-five years in the
formal labor market. Indeed, other studies have demonstrated that individ-
uals with low income go in and out of the formal labor market (Maloney
1999). Perhaps the only reason why the MPG might not be expensive for
the government would be because many low-income affiliates will not meet
the twenty-five-year contribution minimum. Levy (2006: Table 5) calculates
that the density of workers with 2 times the minimum salary is less than 47
percent, which means that workers at this level of income will need to be
in the labor force for more than 50 years to be eligible for the minimum
guaranteed pension.
Conclusions and Recommendations
When the new system was introduced, the federal government emphasized
certain benefits that it would offer. However, many of the benefits have not
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materialized, despite some claims to the contrary. In fact, in many ways, the
new system may be no more efficient than the old. To sum up:
1. The new pension system was supposed to reduce the informal seg-
ment of the market and increase coverage, historically low in Mexico.
Indeed, a simple headcount of AFORE affiliates shows that the formal
sector does appear to have grown significantly since the reform. Yet
a closer examination of the proportion of affiliates who actually con-
tribute reveals that the numbers of covered individuals are actually
falling.
2. Creation of a voluntary account to encourage contribution has not
worked very well. The voluntary accounts are empty for most people.
Only those who seem to be contributing are the ones who could get
some immediate tax benefits.
3. The new system was designed to allow workers to provide contribu-
tions to finance their own retirement, at least in the long run. As in
Chile, it was felt that this factor would be incentive enough to bring
more workers into the formal system. However, it is becoming clear
that many low-income individuals will not have enough in their own
accounts to support themselves in retirement—leaving the govern-
ment to cover the deficit. To date, no financial provisions have been
made to meet this impending shortfall.
4. The new system was intended to reduce costs associated with retire-
ment but has proven to be costly. Approximately 20 percent of the
resources are being eaten up in commissions during the buildup
phase (both on flow of funds and on balance in the accounts).
5. Privatization of Mexico’s pension system was projected to lighten the
fiscal burden of the government. There are two ways this could be
undermined: (a) the transition costs could turn out higher than antic-
ipated, and (b) government guarantees may prove to be costlier than
anticipated. It is still unclear how much more than what has been
budgeted it will cost at the payout phase if the government has to
provide a subsidy for the low-income affiliates without enough in their
accounts to get one minimum salary equivalent.
6. A comparison of the transition costs of the new system to the costs
of the old system indicates that the new system might not save much
money in the long run, and in fact may turn out to be more expensive.
Notes
1 i.e. enough in the sense of achieving the minimum salary equivalent promised
by the government for all affiliates who comply with the minimum twenty-five-year
contribution period.
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2 The 13,919,377 contributors (see Table 10-3) had a total contribution of
$64,373,740,000 (see Table 10-6), making the average balance per contributor
US$4,625.
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